By Thomas Bernauer, Dieter Ruloff
An exam of the effectiveness of fabric incentives in negotiating palms agreements. It asks even if it truly is brilliant to shop for co-operation from serious states and explores a number of circumstances of nuclear non-proliferation international relations, together with studies with Ukraine and North Korea.
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Additional info for The politics of positive incentives in arms control
Even if a Pareto-improving solution is available, how much a state cares about the relative distribution of joint gains and, implicitly, what it considers as fair depend to some extent on its relationship with other states. The more adversarial a relationship is, the more a country will be concerned about relative benefits and costs of an agreement. , when the survival of a state may be at stake, the problem of relative gains is bound to be particularly serious (Baldwin 1993; Krasner 1991). However, for reasons of simplicity, it is assumed for the time being that in order to secure agreement among countries with asymmetric preferences or capacity, the net benefit (benefits minus costs) of any given country in a group must be positive.
Total disarmament would impose a much greater burden on Country A, whereas a 50 percent cut would leave Country B with a militarily (even more) insignificant arsenal and also impose a much greater burden on A. Under conditions of asymmetric preferences and capacities, successful arms control cooperation often hinges on the possibilities of effectively managing the conflicts that almost unavoidably arise over the costs and benefits that flow from proposed arms control agreements, that is, the possibilities of increasing the benefits or lowering the costs for specific countries to the extent that they become willing and able to cooperate.
If the extortion fails and B does not carry out her threat, the welfare consequences are restricted to the transaction costs. Extortion is basically a test of credibility and occurs only under conditions of incomplete information. If both actors were fully aware of each others' preferences, no Page 4 rational actor would engage in or give in to an extortion. In some cases, the extortionist actor will, to enhance her credibility, carry out her threat or parts thereof and will then promise not to act against her own interests anymore if actor B provides compensation.
The politics of positive incentives in arms control by Thomas Bernauer, Dieter Ruloff